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There’s No Place Like Home
Joy A. Buchanan, Steven Gjerstad, and Vernon L. Smith
The U.S. economy is stuck in a painfully slow recovery. Neither the accommodative monetary
policy nor the fiscal stimulus has catalyzed a strong recovery. We explore why, and indicate a
feasible path to robust growth. We first assess the normal impact of monetary policy on the
course of an economic cycle. We then consider a number of factors that distinguish the Great
Recession from the typical economic cycle, with a view toward identifying important causes of
the recession, but also in order to determine the factors that have limited the impact of
monetary policy and impeded recovery from the recession. Finally, by examining comparable
financial crises and balance sheet recessions in other countries, we present evidence that fiscal
consolidation and the resulting exchange rate depreciation is an effective response to these
crises, and is more likely than a program of government stimulus to generate a robust recovery.
How monetary policy normally works: the 1980 and 1981‐82 recessions as exemplars
Our analysis of the 1980 and 1981‐82 “double‐dip” recessions demonstrates the sharp
impact that monetary policy has on mortgage lending, new home sales, and residential
construction. These were “natural experiments” in which monetary policy was tightened and
relaxed twice in quick succession. With each shift in monetary policy, expenditures on new
housing units responded more quickly and with larger magnitude than output in any other
major sector of the economy. These recessions also demonstrate that housing sales and
construction are reliable leading indicators of a coming downturn. As shown in Figure 1, from
the peak of housing construction in the third quarter of 1978 until the peak of the economic
cycle six quarters later, expenditures on new single‐family and multi‐family housing units
(which we refer to hereafter as “housing construction” or “housing”) fell 21.7%. When housing
construction reached its first trough in the third quarter of 1980 it had fallen 40.6% from its
peak. The decline in new home sales was even more precipitous: from a peak in the second
quarter of 1978 until the peak of the economic cycle seven quarters later, new home sales fell
37.1%. From the peak of new home sales in the second quarter of 1978 until the first trough in
the middle of the 1980 recession, new home sales fell a total of 45.6%. One quarter after
monetary policy was relaxed (i.e., when the Effective Federal Funds rate was reduced from
19.4% in early April 1980 to 9.0% in mid‐June 1980), new home sales shot up 35.9% in the next
quarter; one quarter after that housing construction inceased. When monetary policy was
tightened again toward the end of 1980, new home sales dropped sharply and two quarters
later housing construction began another decline. In the second housing decline, which lasted
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For brevvity we refer to
o households’ durable goodss expendituress (NIPA Table 11.1.5 line 4) ass ‘durables’ (D)), non‐
residential fixed investment (NIPA Table 1.1.5 line 9)) as ‘investmennt’ (I), and expenditure on neew single‐famiily and
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(i.e., inflation adjusted) expenditures on housing fell $88.3 billion, whereas real non‐residential
fixed investment fell only $29.6 billion.2 Over the course of the two combined recessions,
housing fell $120.9 billion, the sum of housing and consumer durables fell $201.7 billion, and
investment fell $131.5 billion. Households’ interest‐rate‐sensitive components of consumption
therefore had a stronger impact on the development of this downturn than non‐residential
fixed investment: housing plus durables peaked 12 quarters before investment, and the dollar
amount of their decline exceeded the investment decline by 53.4%. The timing and the
magnitude of these events reveal that housing and households’ durable goods consumption
play a crucial role in economic cycles.
The usual impact of monetary policy
One of the key observations from this episode is that, under normal circumstances,
monetary policy has its sharpest impact on mortgage finance and consumer lending. When the
Federal Reserve increases its purchases of short‐term Treasury securities, that pushes their
price up, lowering short‐term interest rates. This has two effects on depository institutions. It
brings down their cost of funds: since Treasury bills – a close substitute for demand and time
deposits – have a low yield, banks can pay a low interest rate and still attract deposits. At the
same time, mortgage and other interest rates fall much more slowly, so open market purchases
by the Federal Reserve open up a gap between the lending and borrowing rates of depository
institutions. Consequently, open market purchases by the Federal Reserve encourage lending,
primarily to households and to small businesses who rely on financial intermediaries for access
to credit.3 When mortgage lending increases, that immediately leads to sales of new homes,
which in turn leads to construction of new homes to replenish the depleted inventory. When
lending to consumers increases, consumer durable good sales increase. These effects are
clearly demonstrated in Figure 1, which shows that each shift to short‐term interest rates led to
a corresponding shift in new home sales and also to a change in residential construction and

multi‐family housing units (NIPA Table 5.3.5 line 19) as ‘housing’ (H). (Many researchers take NIPA Table 1.1.5 line
12 as their measure of residential construction, but that category includes brokers’ commissions on real estate
sales and other miscellaneous items.) All series are converted from nominal to real figures by dividing by GDP
deflators. GDP deflators are calculated by dividing NIPA Table 1.1.5 line 1 by Table 1.1.6 line 1. In addition to GDP
and some of its components from the NIPA, we also graph new home sales which are compiled by the Census
Bureau and reported at http://www.census.gov/const/soldreg.pdf.
2

Unless otherwise noted, dollar amounts in this article are inflation adjusted to 2005 dollars.

3

While households and small businesses rely on financial intermediaries, large corporations typically have access
to corporate bond markets especially for their long‐term financing requirements. Consequently they are less
affected by shifts in monetary policy that primarily affect the incentive of financial intermediaries to lend.
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Between
n 1996 and 2006, annual rates of real house price appreeciation were ‐‐1.1% (in 1996
6), 2.5% (1997)), 5.4%
(1998), 5.4
4% (1999), 6.1%
% (2000), 5.7%
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ncreases were associated wiith historically high levels off mortgage creedit, as
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Where did the money come from that fueled the large price increases and the large
accumulation of mortgage debt between 2002 and 2005? In part it came from the extreme
monetary ease from 2001 to 2004,7 but in considerable part it came from overseas. In 1997,
the current account deficit (the amount of money flowing into the country minus what was
flowing out) stood at $152.8 billion or 1.55% of GDP. By 2006 the current account deficit had
ballooned to $772.9 billion or 5.97% of GDP.8
When rapidly escalating mortgage delinquencies revealed the fragility of the housing market
in 2006, the flow of mortgage funds abruptly began a sharp decline, and the price collapse
accelerated. The impact of these developments on housing is apparent in Figure 3: sales of new
homes began a sharp collapse in the first quarter of 2006 and residential construction began to
collapse the next quarter. When investment peaked in the first quarter of 2008, housing plus
durables had already fallen $230.9 billion over the previous seven quarters.
The grey area in Figure 3 shows the recession. It was not until the third quarter of 2011 that
GDP recovered to its peak level from the first quarter of 2008. This is the longest downturn in
GDP since the end of the Second World War. The recoveries to investment and consumer
durables have been weak, and there has been no recovery in housing, as Figure 3 shows. This
lack of response to historically low short‐term interest rates has no precedent in the post‐war
era: residential construction has increased more than any other area of the economy after
every recession between the 1948‐49 recession and the 2001 recession.
Figure 4 shows the collapse of home equity. The figure shows that the value of homes
moved up with mortgage debt from 1997 through the first quarter of 2006.9 Afterward, home
value began to decline, mortgage debt held steady, home equity plunged, and it is now below
its level 1997. Since the banks hold the mortgage debt of households, bank balance sheets have
suffered a decline in asset value and this has reduced their willingness to lend.
An unusually large inventory of homes from foreclosure is suppressing housing construction;
damage to household balance sheets is limiting recovery of durable goods consumption; and
suppressed aggregate demand is limiting the need for non‐residential fixed investment.
Evidence of all three problems is visible in Figure 3. Resolution of the first problem takes time:
a decrease in the surplus of homes is difficult when slow job creation reduces the rate of

7

Note the turnaround and surge in the flow of mortgage credit in Figure 2. The Federal Funds rate was not
tightened until the end of 2004 (Figure 3).
8

The current account deficit figures are from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Table F.107, line 63.

9

Households’ residential assets are from the Flow of Funds, Table B.100, line 4. Residential mortgage debt is from
the Flow of Funds, Table L.218, line 2. Housing equity is the value of residential real estate minus mortgage debt.
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$6.92 trillion to $6.56 trillion.11 If, as we argued, it is the gap between lending rates and
funding costs that create the incentive to lend, then the lack of response to QE2 is
understandable: whatever problems restrained lending before QE2 remained during the QE2
program, because the QE2 program only drove the yield on short‐term Treasury debt down
from 0.2% to 0.1%. Although it’s possible that bank lending would have fallen more without
the QE2 program, its ineffectiveness strongly suggests that monetary policy alone cannot
rekindle investment and growth in the current environment.
Neither fiscal stimulus nor exceptionally easy monetary policy has been effective in
generating a robust recovery. We believe this poor performance relates directly to the severe
household and bank balance sheet damage caused by the housing boom and bust. Until that
damage is repaired we are unlikely to see robust economic growth. The challenge then is to
determine what course of action promotes balance sheet repair. Our examination of past
financial crises indicates that fiscal consolidation has triggered exchange rate depreciation in
other countries, and depreciation has led to strong recoveries based on export growth.
Financial Inflows and Depreciation
In all of the cases we’ve examined of economies that experience a boom and collapse, with a
financial crisis precipitated by the collapse, a rapid increase in fixed investment has been a
significant element of the boom.12 In most of these cases, substantial support for the boom has
come from foreign investment. During a boom, most financial inflows find their way into
private investments by either households or firms. After a boom in fixed investment collapses,
the demand for private investment instruments (such as mortgage‐backed securities)
diminishes sharply. If the supply of public investment instruments (i.e., sovereign debt) also
declines, there are few instruments that foreign investors can obtain from a country that has
been running a current account deficit. This necessitates a change. If foreign investors don’t
find appealing investment instruments, then financial inflows will cease or even switch
direction. The immediate effect of the reduced foreign demand for investment instruments is a
decline in the exchange rate. This currency depreciation immediately reduces the price of
exports and raises the price of imports; exporters expand output in response to the surge in
profit margins. Hence, the reversal of financial and capital account flows translate into a
reversal of the current account deficit. And the shift toward exports also adds to total output
and generates an added income stream for export‐oriented firms, for their suppliers, and for
the labor market.
11

The figures on bank lending come from line 9 on page 2 of the H.8 release from the Federal Reserve.

12

Fixed investments are primarily residential and commercial structures and firms’ investments in plants and
equipment.
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Fiscal Consolidation, Depreciation and Export Growth in the Finnish, Thai, and Icelandic Crises
The course of the Finnish, Thai, and Icelandic bubbles and collapses and their financial crises
were similar in many ways to our own experience although the downturns in GDP and in fixed
investment were considerably larger in all three than they were in the U.S. GDP fell 12.6% in
Finland, 16.0% in Thailand, and 14.3% in Iceland. From the peak of fixed capital investment just
before the start of the crises, Finnish fixed investment fell 52.5%, fixed investment in Thailand
fell 58.9%, and Iceland’s fixed investment fell 77.7%. In Finland, fixed investment peaked in the
last quarter of 1989; it was 17 ½ years before fixed investment reached that level again. In
Thailand, fixed investment peaked 15 years ago (in the fourth quarter of 1996), yet real fixed
investment was still 9.9% below that peak level in the third quarter of 2011. In the third
quarter of 2001, real fixed investment in Iceland is 67.7% below the peak it attained in the
fourth quarter of 2006. In the U.S., non‐residential fixed investment plus investment in
residential structures fell 32.5% between its peak in the first quarter of 2006 and its trough in
the fourth quarter of 2009; it now stands 23.4% below its peak level. In all of these economies,
for a recovery something needs to pick up the slack from the steep declines in fixed investment.
We’ve seen common patterns in Finland, Thailand, and Iceland. In each of these countries,
when fixed investment collapsed, economic output contracted sharply. But in all three cases,
capital inflows and the current account deficit continued until government expenditures were
curtailed; once government expenditures fell, neither the private sector nor the public sector
could absorb capital inflows from abroad. International capital inflows reversed direction, their
currencies depreciated sharply, and net exports grew rapidly.
Following depreciation, when exports rapidly increase (and typically overtake imports as
they did in Finland, Thailand, and Iceland), that addresses several problems. First, a current
account surplus replaces the net capital inflows that existed when the country was running a
current account deficit. That is, the income stream generated when exports exceed imports is a
form of capital formation that can replace the financial inflows from abroad that prevailed
before depreciation and the current account reversal. Second, the capital formation that
results from a reversal of the current account can be used to repay the foreign debts
accumulated during the period of current account deficits; far from “beggaring” their
neighbors, they are paying them back. Third, export production becomes a source of growth in
place of the growth of fixed investments that is so common during a boom. Finally,
depreciation creates the inflationary pressure that domestic monetary policy was impotent to
create, and typically overcomes the deflationary pressure that is so commonly a part of the
collapse of an investment boom. These forces begin mending damaged balance sheets by
reducing debt load relative to asset value, and rebuilding equity.

9

The declines in investment in Finland, Thailand, and Iceland were extremely deep, yet
growth rates during the recovery periods in those countries have been considerably higher than
in the U.S. since the second quarter of 2009. The annual growth rate in the U.S. in the ten
quarters since the bottom of the recession has been 2.4%. In Finland, the annual growth rate
over the first ten quarters after the recession was 3.4% and in Thailand it was 5.0%. Iceland is
only 5 quarters into its recovery but its growth rate over that period has been 5.5% per year.
Our argument is that export driven growth is the most effective course when the collapse of a
fixed investment boom leads to losses on assets, a financial crisis, a severe downturn and
damaged balance sheets. This constitutes the most powerful argument as to why fiscal
consolidation can work to restore growth after a balance sheet recession.
The Finnish Crisis
The Finnish crisis was preceded by a long period with a high level of fixed investment that
increased until it peaked at 30.4% of GDP. Fixed investment began to collapse in the first
quarter of 1990. By the time of the banking crisis in the fall of 1991, fixed investment had fallen
nearly 30%. Government expenditures continued to rise rapidly during the first six quarters of
the downturn, but after the financial crisis, government expenditures leveled off in the last
quarter of 1991 and began to fall early in 1992. This led to a sharp depreciation of the Finnish
markka between August of 1992 and February of 1993. Exports, which had been fluctuating in
a narrow range around 25% of the Finnish economy since the last quarter of 1985, began to
surge immediately after the depreciation of the markka, reaching 35% of Finnish output two
years after the depreciation began. In a pattern that we’ve seen following financial crises in
many countries, when government expenditures were curtailed, the currency depreciated
sharply and the growth rate of exports moved sharply ahead of the growth rate of imports. The
reduction to government expenditures came at the middle of the depression, but even after
the depression ended there was a modest decline in government expenditures that continued
until the recovery was well underway.
Soon after government expenditures began to fall, the value of the Finnish markka fell
33.3%. By the time that the sharp depreciation ended, a gap had already opened up between
exports and imports. That gap grew over time and by the end of 1993 Finland had entered a
current account surplus. (The fact that net exports were almost 4% of GDP in the third quarter
of 1993 and the current account was still negative indicates that service costs on external debt
were large in Finland after the large capital inflows in the 1980s.)
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investments might not perform well. When the currency depreciates excessive inflows of
capital decline and eventually reverse. The fundamental dislocation during the crisis and
depression was a collapse of fixed investment; the recovery consisted primarily in filling the gap
from the reduction to fixed investment with export growth. Fixed investment was 29.7% of the
Finnish economy at the peak of the economic cycle in the first quarter of 1990. When the peak
level of GDP was first reached again in the fourth quarter of 1996, fixed investment was 18.2%
of GDP. Exports increased by 15.1% of GDP over that period, while imports increased by 8.0%
of GDP. Net exports increased by 7.1% of GDP over that period while fixed investment declined
by 11.5% of GDP. To a large extent the recovery consisted of a shift from fixed investment to
production for export to the rest of the world.
One frequent objection to depreciation is that it will set off a series of competitive
devaluations that essentially constitute a zero‐sum game in which countries in succession
follow a beggar‐thy‐neighbor strategy, taking export market share away from other countries.
But this is not what happened in Finland: imports into Finland rose along with exports after the
depreciation of the markka. In the eight years preceding devaluation, real imports in Finland
grew 4.1% (only 0.5% per year); in the first four years after depreciation real imports grew
38.2% (8.4% per year) and in the first eight years after depreciation they grew 73.2% (7.1% per
year). In most of the other serious downturns that we’ve examined, including Thailand, Korea,
and Argentina, large import increases have followed depreciation, so this objection to
depreciation has no empirical support in the crisis countries that we have evaluated.
The Thai Crisis
We’ve described linkages from fiscal discipline to currency depreciation, and from
depreciation to a shift toward export‐led growth in Finland. We next turn to Thailand where
the same sequence played out. As in the U.S. over the decade from 1997 to 2006, Thailand
went through a long period of large current account deficits. As in the U.S., as investment grew
and current account deficits accumulated, investors eventually grew skittish and withdrew.
After asset values fell and international financial inflows ceased, the financial crisis developed
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance was sought. Loan funds from the IMF were
provided with the stipulation that government finances remain on a solid foundation.
Restricted access to foreign capital meant that capital was scarce, and that a reversal of the
current account from deficit to surplus was the only way to improve liquidity.
In Thailand, the collapses in construction and investment were very pronounced, as was the
16.0% decline in real GDP. Reversal of the current account deficit came early in the Thai
depression, and the improvement was extremely rapid and then subsided. If we examine the
changes in output from the peak of the economic cycle in the third quarter of 1996 to output
12

when the
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Figure 6: The
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From the peak of the economic cycle in the third quarter of 1996 until that peak output level
was finally reached again in the first quarter of 2002, fixed investment fell from 39.6% of GDP
to 23.0% of GDP. During the same period, exports went from 37.8% of GDP to 61.7% of GDP,
and imports increased from 43.7% of GDP to 54.3% of GDP. As in the Finnish depression, fixed
investment fell substantially as a proportion of GDP, and net exports made up for much of the
decline. In Thailand the decline in fixed investment was 16.6% of GDP and the increase in net
exports was 13.3% of GDP. Clearly it was net exports that made up for most of the decline in
fixed investment. Moreover, as in Finland, in Thailand depreciation led to an increase in
imports. Between the peak of the economic cycle in the third quarter of 1996 and the recovery
to the peak in the first quarter of 2002, Thai imports grew from 43.7% of GDP to 54.3% of GDP.
The Icelandic Crisis
The Icelandic crisis was preceded by several years of extraordinary capital inflows. At its
maximum, the gap between imports and exports reached 19.6% of GDP in the second quarter
of 2006. These capital inflows supported equally extraordinary growth of fixed investment.
Between the first quarter of 2002 and the fourth quarter of 2006, the annual growth rate of
fixed investment in Iceland was 26.8%. For perspective, growth of fixed investment exceeded
total growth of the Icelandic economy during that period. When the fixed investment bubble
burst, the collapse was even faster than the expansion had been – real fixed capital formation
fell 77.7% in only 9 quarters – and it fell to a level below its level when the rapid expansion
began.
The rapid expansion of fixed investment was fueled by the large increase in the deposits in
the Icelandic banking system. According to the Central Bank of Iceland, the liabilities of the
Icelandic Banking system reached 12.9 times GDP on the eve of the financial crisis. The U.S. has
a large banking system, but the liabilities of our financial sector in the third quarter of 2008
when the financial crisis struck was 1.18 times GDP.
Soon after the financial crisis entered its final stage in the U.S. conditions deteriorated
sharply in Iceland. The assets of the Icelandic banking system were illiquid and their value fell
sharply in the last quarter of 2008. Iceland turned to the IMF for loans, and the IMF required
fiscal consolidation as a condition of the loans. The krona began to depreciate just after fiscal
consolidation was undertaken, and the exports quickly overtook imports. As in Finland and
Thailand, the improvement in net exports has been the major contributor to the recovery up to
this point. Real GDP in Iceland now (as of the third quarter of 2011) is just above its level in the
fourth quarter of 2006 when fixed investment peaked. Over that nearly five year period, fixed
investment has fallen from 34.7% of GDP to 11.2% of GDP – a decline of 23.5% of GDP. In that
same period, exports have increased by 27.3% of GDP and imports have fallen by 1.5% of GDP,
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experience of other countries strongly suggests that in these circumstances fiscal consolidation
triggers a mechanism – currency depreciation – that supports recovery of aggregate output.
The fiscal consolidation‐currency depreciation mechanism is remarkable13; it offers a subtle
end‐run around the failure of monetary ease to stimulate households’ demand for housing and
durable goods via the normal route of lowering their financing cost. The effect of depreciation
is to immediately increase the solvency and improve the balance sheets in export related
industries. It will also tend to be inflationary and this serves to initiate a mechanism for
reducing the burden of debt and improving balance sheets generally in the economy.
Although the export increases in Finland, Thailand, and Iceland were very large, comparable
increases are not required in the U.S. for at least two reasons. In Finland, fixed investment fell
from 30.4% of GDP just before the peak of their economic cycle to only 16.0% four years later.
In the U.S., fixed investment (including residential construction) fell from a peak of 15.0% of
GDP to 10.1% of GDP. The fixed investment decline in Finland was over 2¾ times as large
relative to GDP as it was in the U.S. In the third quarter of 2011, investment in the U.S. is $380
billion below its peak level. In Finland most of the adjustment took the form of a shift from
fixed investment toward a greater emphasis on exports. For the U.S. to replace that investment
gap with exports, we would need to see an increase in exports from 13.9% of GDP to 16.4% of
GDP. An increase in exports of this magnitude is feasible. Even if the effect is not that large, it
would work the right direction, aiding recovery.
Fiscal stimulus serves only to extend a current account deficit from the pre‐crash period into
the post‐crash period, pushing up the value of the dollar, making our exports less competitive
on world markets. We’ve shown three countries that all cut their government expenditures
and quickly experienced a sharp depreciation, rapid export growth, and then a robust
recovery. All three of these countries experienced a reduction in fixed investment during their
crash that was much more severe than our own. In one of these cases, Finland, it took 17 ½
years before real fixed investment recovered to its pre‐crisis level; even after it had recovered,
fixed investment remained a much smaller part of the economy. At the peak of the investment
boom in the last quarter of 1989 fixed investment was 30.4% of the Finnish economy; in the
second quarter of 2011 twenty‐one and a half years after the collapse began it was 19.0% of
their economy. Two decades after the collapse fixed investment has not recovered the role
that it had in the Finnish economy before the collapse, and probably never will. Proponents of
fiscal stimulus suggest that government expenditures should fill the gap from declining private
investment, but this is an enormous gap to fill, and past experience suggests that it would need
to be filled for a long time. No government could persist in such a program and remain solvent,
13
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nor is there any need to do so. The growth and recovery in Finland, as in Thailand and Iceland,
came in net exports. Fortunately for the U.S., we had a much smaller decline in fixed
investment, from 15.0% of GDP to 10.1% of GDP, so we need a much smaller increase in
exports to compensate for the investment decline. But there is good reason to believe that
we’ll need the growth in exports to compensate for the decline in fixed investment: in the year
and a half since fixed investment bottomed out at 10.1% of GDP, it has only risen to 11.1% of
GDP. We’ve only recovered one fifth of the way to the peak of fixed investment when it
reached 15.0% of GDP five and a half years ago. Based on our own slow recovery, and on the
decade and a half that it has taken other countries to regain declines in fixed investment after
fixed investment booms end, it seems clear that something else needs to fill the gap: export‐led
growth has filled that role in all of the other comparable crashes that we’ve examined.
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